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OHIO APPELLATE COURT HOLDS THAT STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED AWARDS OF 
ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE PROPERLY DECIDED BY ARBITRATORS  
By 
Nick Fox* 
 
I.      INTRODUCTION 
In Corbin v. Kelly Plating Co., the Court of Appeals of Ohio, 8th District 
considered an appeal from a plaintiff-appellant for issuance of a statutorily 
authorized award of attorney’s fees.1 While in court-annexed arbitration, the 
appellant neither presented the issue of attorney’s fees to the arbitral panel, nor 
preserved the issue for the trial court to decide.2 After the arbitral award was 
confirmed by the court, the appellant motioned the court for the fees.3 Appellant 
pursued the sought-after attorney’s fees in the intermediate appellate court.4 As a 
matter of first impression, the Court identified a strikingly similar case decided by 
the Illinois Supreme Court, and adopted the holding and reasoning nearly 
verbatim.5   
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Joe L. Corbin, appellant, worked for appellee, Kelly Plating Company 
(“Kelly Plating”).6 At times, Corbin worked a late shift and at other times in a 
supervisory role.7 Under both circumstances, he was entitled to earn an increased 
wage beyond his base pay.8 Kelly Plating, however, did not consider these factors 
                                                 
*Nick Fox is a 2012 Juris Doctor candidate at the Pennsylvania State University Dickinson 
School of Law. 
1 Corbin v. Kelly Plating Co., 931 N.E.2d 204, 205 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010). 
2 Id. at 207.  
3 Id. at 206. 
4 Id. 
5 Cruz v. Nw. Chrysler Plymouth Sales, 688 N.E.2d 653 (1997). 
6 Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 206. 
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
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when it issued Corbin’s paychecks.9 On January 15, 2008, Corbin filed a civil suit 
against Kelly Plating alleging breach of federal and state wage and employment 
laws.10 Corbin sought relief in the form of back wages, liquidated damages, and 
attorney’s fees under both the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Ohio’s 
wage and overtime law.11 
Kelly Plating answered the complaint and filed counterclaims alleging that 
Corbin regularly left work early and that he also owed them for various fees for 
union dues and uniforms.12 Shortly thereafter, the trial court ordered the case to 
proceed through court-annexed arbitration, pursuant to a local rule requiring 
arbitration.13 Accordingly, the parties submitted their claims to an arbitral panel 
and proceeded through a series of hearings.14 On September 11, 2008, the panel 
issued an award whose net amount favored Corbin  by $1,100.15 Approximately 
one month later, the trial court confirmed the arbitral panel’s decision.16  
Just four days later, Corbin motioned to the trial court seeking attorney’s 
fees in the amount of nearly $14,000.17 The trial court denied the motion on 
grounds that the motion was untimely and that the issue should have either been 
properly submitted to the arbitral panel or excepted from their consideration.18 
Corbin appealed the trial court’s decision.19 
Corbin asked the appellate court to review the trial court’s determination 
that denied his request for attorney’s fees.20 Corbin contended that attorney’s fees 
are wholly distinct from any judgment award, and are only to be awarded after the 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 206 n.2 (referencing Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-
219 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4111.01-4111.99 (West 2011)). 
12 Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 206. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 206. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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judgment is entered.21 He further argued that an award of attorney’s fees would be 
speculative if issued by an arbitral panel.22 Part of this contention stemmed from 
uncertainty accompanying the possibility that the arbitral award would be 
appealed.23 Corbin reasoned that at the point in time when the panel was able to 
award attorney’s fees, it would be inappropriate to do so.24  
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
 The appellate court reviewed Corbin’s claims de novo.25 The principal 
issue under review was whether a court can properly award statutorily authorized 
attorney’s fees after it has confirmed an arbitral award.26 In considering this issue, 
the court recognized that it would be required to weigh two important policy 
considerations.27 The first is the legislature’s desire to ensure that litigants are 
reimbursed for their attorney’s fees in appropriate cases.28 The contrasting 
consideration is the safeguarding of the perception that court-annexed arbitration 
can provide a less expensive and more expedient means to adjudicate claims.29 
 The court first examined the trial court’s decision not to award attorney’s 
fees post hoc.30 A driving force that influenced the trial court’s decision was their 
determination that the arbitrator was in the better position to determine the amount 
of reasonable fees.31 Since this was a case of first impression for the appellate 
                                                 
21 Id. at 209. 
22 Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 210. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 206. 
26 Id. at 210. 
27 Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 205. 
28 Id.  
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 208. 
31 Id.; See Moore v. First Bank of San Luis Obispo, 996 P.2d 706 (Cal. 2000); Dickins v. 
Lee, 230 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (1991); and Turnberry Assoc. v. Serv. Station Aid, 651 So. 2d 
1173 (Fla. 1995). 
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court, it looked outward for direction to benchmark the trial court’s 
determination.32 Specifically, the court considered cases decided in California, 
Florida, and Illinois. The court particularly focused on an Illinois decision, Cruz v. 
Northwestern Chrysler Plymouth Sales, Inc..33 Cruz involved a dispute stemming 
from the sale of an automobile under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business 
Practices Act.34 The case was ordered into court-annexed arbitration.35 On the issue 
of statutorily authorized attorney’s fees, the court held that in order to recover 
attorney’s fees, the plaintiff must present a claim for them to the arbitration 
panel.36 The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court, which 
awarded attorney’s fees despite the fact that the party failed to properly appeal the 
arbitral award during the prescribed time frame.37 The Cruz court emphasized that 
the arbitral panel is best suited to decipher and establish an award of attorney’s 
fees because, “the court will know virtually nothing about the issues in the case, 
how difficult it was to litigate, or how effectively counsel-represented his clients. 
The arbitration panel, not the . . . court, is therefore the proper body to rule on 
statutory fee requests.”38 The Ohio court in the instant case virtually adopted the 
holding and reasoning of the Cruz court.39 The court then addressed what 
constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees in Ohio as specified by the Ohio Rule of 
Professional Conduct.40 “The arbitration panel is familiar with the time, novelty, 
nature, experience, and range of possible results in the cases before them. 
Therefore, [they] are in the best possible position to determine what [is] a 
reasonable fee.”41 
                                                 
32 Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 208. 
33 Id. (citing Cruz v. Nw. Chrysler Plymouth Sales, Inc., 688 N.E.2d 653, 654 (Ill. 1997)). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. (citing Cruz, 688 N.E.2d at 654). 
36 Id. at 208.  
37 Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 208. 
38 Id. (citing Cruz, 688 N.E.2d at 657-58). 
39 Id.  
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 209. 
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 In addressing Corbin’s contentions that attorney’s fees are the exclusive 
domain of the courts, and such an award by an arbitral panel would be improper, 
the court once again relied on Cruz.42 The Cruz court articulated its rationale that 
directly rebutted Corbin’s position, by suggesting that the entire system of 
mandatory arbitration rested upon the condition that defendants can rely on the 
arbitrator’s award as fixing their maximum exposure to liability.43 The court 
further speculated that the if courts were permitted to award attorney’s fees on top 
of the award issued by arbitrators, few if any defendants would accept the 
arbitrator’s decision as binding.44 Additionally, the court reasoned that every case 
where attorney’s fees are possible would require the participation of a trial court to 
determine the award.45 This is impractical and detracts from the efficiency that 
court-annexed arbitration provides.46 Ultimately, the court arrived at a decision 
based largely upon reasoning borrowed from Cruz to affirm the order of the trial 
court, denying the award of attorney’s fees.47 
 
IV. SIGNIFICANCE  
Corbin is significant because it establishes a precedent for all would-be 
litigants in Ohio to follow when pursuing an arbitral award of attorney’s fees. The 
court signals a tendency to favor preservation of the efficiencies of court-annexed 
arbitration over preserving individual rights to full compensation for incurred 
costs. This is especially evidenced by the court’s acknowledgement that Corbin 
was in-fact entitled to the attorney’s fees.48 Moving forward, litigants will benefit 
                                                 
42 Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 209. 
43 Id.; see Cruz, 688 N.E.2d at 657. 
44 Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 208; see Cruz, 688 N.E.2d at 657. 
45 Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 210. 
46 Id. 
47 Corbin, 931 N.E.2d at 211. 
48 Id. at 210.  
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from knowing that untimely motions for attorney’s fees that stem from court-
annexed arbitration will not be entertained by Ohio courts. 
 
